Abstract-Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) provide a device-unique challenge-response mapping and are employed for authentication and encryption purposes. Unpredictability and reliability are the core requirements of PUFs: unpredictability implies that an adversary cannot sufficiently predict future responses from previous observations. Reliability is important as it increases the reproducibility of PUF responses and hence allows validation of expected responses. However, advanced machinelearning algorithms have been shown to be a significant threat to the practical validity of PUFs, as they are able to accurately model PUF behavior. The most effective technique was shown to be the XOR-based combination of multiple PUFs, but as this approach drastically reduces reliability, it does not scale well against software-based machine-learning attacks. In this paper, we analyze threats to PUF security and propose PolyPUF, a scalable and secure architecture to introduce polymorphic PUF behavior. This architecture significantly increases model-building resistivity while maintaining reliability. An extensive experimental evaluation and comparison demonstrate that the PolyPUF architecture can secure various PUF configurations and is the only evaluated approach to withstand highly complex neural network machine-learning attacks. Furthermore, we show that PolyPUF consumes less energy and has less implementation overhead in comparison to lightweight reference architectures.
I. INTRODUCTION

H
ARDWARE security is increasingly recognized as an important research area for current and future devices. Security features are required for all modern communication and computing devices, particularly for verification of authenticity and data confidentiality. Diverse hardware-based threats such as hardware trojan horses, reverse engineering, physical de-packaging and modification, machine-learning, and side-channel attacks not only lead to billion dollar losses in counterfeits [1] , but also challenge the capabilities of existing security techniques.
Hardware security is of particular value for emerging mobile applications such as wireless sensor networks, radiofrequency identification chips, and smart cards. For these devices, conventional security techniques exceed power and footprint limitations. For instance, even widely used publickey cryptography techniques have high computational cost that can exceed the capabilities of such devices or can strain Manuscript received April 28, 2015; revised August 2, 2015; accepted September 11, 2015 . Date of publication October 6, 2015; date of current version June 16, 2016 . This paper was recommended by Associate Editor S. Bhunia.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TCAD.2015.2488493 mobility by depleting their battery. Moreover, conventional defenses against physical attacks such as metal-meshes or tamper sensing through signal carrying wires require constant power supply and are therefore infeasible when low cost is a requirement. Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are promising security primitives as they are based on intrinsic nano-scale manufacturing variations, are lightweight, and provide resistivity against physical attacks. It is a binary mapping that represents the unique IC fingerprint by accumulating and reflecting the manufacturing process variations that went into each specific device. The input and output of this function are referred to as challenge and response, respectively. This function is a {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n mapping with m challenge bits and n response bits, which we refer to as an m × n PUF in this paper. A wide range of variation sources are used to generate this fingerprint, for example, the unique constellation of carbon nanotubes [2] in carbon nanotube transistors. Due to the utilization of manufacturing variations, the exhibited challenge-response behavior is device unique and is not physically reproducible by remanufacturing. Furthermore, the secret of the PUF is the internal physical structure and therefore adversaries cannot easily extract it. This dependence of the PUF behavior on the exact physical parameters provides the PUF with a volatility which implies destruction of the secret on invasive physical attacks.
Although the PUF behavior is primarily determined by manufacturing variations, it is also influenced by environment variations including temperature, pressure, electromagnetic waves, and quantum fluctuations [3] that can deteriorate PUF reliability. This lack of reliability reflects as noise in the challenge-response behavior and is characterized as the perbit error rate in the responses when the same challenge is repeatedly issued. A common application is authentication, where a trusted party proves its authenticity by demonstrating ownership of the PUF.
The two primary concerns for the widespread viability of PUF-based security are reliability and resistivity against machine-learning. As previously stated, the volatility of a PUF is a benefit against invasive attacks, but it also introduces biterrors as a disadvantage. The volatile nature leads to small changes in the PUF response due to environment variations. With reduced reliability, the obstacles in other areas increase; for instance, costly error-correction may be required, which in turn requires increased PUF sizes due to entropy loss. The issue of machine-learning resistance is important to guarantee that adversaries cannot create a model for the PUF. If an adversary successfully creates a model, it would fatally defeat any security application of the PUF; for instance in token-based authentication, an adversary with an accurate model can impersonate PUF ownership and thus achieves 0278-0070 c 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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false acceptance. Reliability and resistance against machinelearning are particularly difficult to achieve, as the techniques to implement them have contradictory effects. On the one hand, a common approach to increase the machine-learning resistance is to combine the responses of multiple PUFs. However, this also has a multiplying effect on the volatility induced bit-error rate and thus reduces reliability. On the other hand, reliability can be increased by implementing errorcorrection, for instance through repetition codes. However, this introduces information leakage and thus decreases the resistance against model-building attacks. An additional major disadvantage of the reliability-reducing strong PUFs is that the increased error rate forces longer responses, which in turn requires transmission of longer bit strings and can have a significant impact on energy consumption [4] . As reliability with simultaneous model-building resistance are the primary concerns of PUF, they are the focus of this paper.
The problem with resistance against machine-learning is fundamentally due to two issues: 1) complexity and 2) determinism. A highly complex behavioral pattern is very difficult to learn through machine-learning, as more training data and computational resources are needed. The difficulty with increasing complexity in a PUF is that it typically has a detrimental effect on reliability. For machine-learning algorithms, deterministic behavior is the ideal training target, as the pattern to be learned can be accurately specified. As determinism is reduced, for instance due to noise, learning algorithms require more computational resources and training data to identify the underlying pattern. As such, reducing determinism is a viable approach to counter machine-learning techniques. For PUF, however, high determinism is required so that the response to any given challenge can be compared to a known correct response. In this paper, we present the first PUF architecture with intentional nondeterminism and allow the PUF to change randomly between multiple behavioral patterns.
The unique contributions made in this paper are as follows.
1) The first PUF architecture to achieve unpredictable nondeterministic polymorphic challenge-response behavior.
2) The first PUF architecture to demonstrate strong and scalable machine-learning resistance without detrimental effect on reliability and with wide applicability. 3) A consistent security solution by evaluating and eliminating other threat vectors such as an unprotected random number generator. 4) Quantitative evaluation of neural network attacks on our proposed PolyPUF architecture against reference architectures with various PUF configurations and training sets of up to one million examples. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we introduce relevant background and discuss related work. In Section III, we introduce PolyPUF and describe the polymorphic behavior it exhibits. In Section IV, the practicality and possible applications of PolyPUF are discussed. Section V discusses various security concerns with existing work and clarifies the security advantages of PolyPUF. We provide an analysis of possible attacks in Section VI. In Section VII, we present an extensive evaluation of PolyPUF and existing techniques. We conclude in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND A. Notation
We denote binary vectors in bold lowercase characters. As such, we refer to a PUF challenge as c and to the response as r. Multiple binary vectors are differentiated through use of a subscript, e.g., challenges |c 1 | and |c 2 |. We denote random binary vectors as x. The length of the vector is indicated through their absolute value, e.g., challenge length |c|. The individual bits are referenced through round brackets, e.g., c(i) where i ∈ [0, |c|]. Sets are denoted through uppercase letters, e.g., A. Due to their significance for this paper, we denote bit-error rates with . The Hamming distance between two bit-vectors a and b is denoted by a,b . In larger equations where this subscript notation is not suitable, we also use a,b = HD(a, b) interchangeably.
B. Statistical PUF Behavior
In cryptography, confusion and diffusion are the important properties of a security primitive. Confusion describes the complexity of the relation between the secret key and the cipher text, and diffusion describes the complexity between plain text and cipher text. In the context of evaluating a PUF, diffusion can be described as the complexity of the relation between the input (challenge) and output (response) of the PUF.
With low diffusion, knowledge of the response to one challenge c i implicitly provides information on similar other challenges c j where the distance c i ,c j is smaller than a threshold d th . It follows that machine-learning algorithms can extract significant information on the challenge-response behavior from few challenge-response pairs (CRPs). Moreover, weak diffusion also enables a modified form of repetition attacks, where an adversary reuses a previously observed response r i = PUF(c i ) for a new challenge c j , where c i = c j and c i ,c j < d th with hopes that it will be accepted instead of r j = PUF(c j ). Here, r i ,r j is small, as the originating challenges are close to each other. Due to bit-error mandated authentication thresholds, the response will be accepted when r i ,r j is small. For the average response in a large set of CRPs, this generalizes to
In contrast, high diffusion implies internal complexity and provides high resistance against machine-learning attacks.
The avalanche criterion is another desirable property requiring that a small change in the input changes the output significantly. The strict avalanche criterion requires that any input bit flip leads to a flip in each output bit with a probability of 50%, which implies strong randomization and therefore difficult input prediction.
C. Strong and Weak PUFs
PUFs are divided into two main categories, weak PUFs and strong PUFs. Weak PUFs allow a small number of challenges, in some cases only a single challenge can be issued. Their most common application is the generation of secret keys that can be used for cryptography. An example for this category is the static random-access memory (SRAM) PUF, which employs the start-up state of SRAM cells to generate a response. strong PUFs must have a large CRP space such that it is unreasonable that an adversary can obtain a large share of all possible CRPs. Furthermore, its behavior must be unpredictable for an adversary and must provide tamper resistance [5] . Whereas the requirement of a large challenge response space is easily accomplished, unpredictability is an ongoing concern as discussed before.
Strong PUFs are subdivided into a variety of different designs that exploit physical variations through delay, frequency, temperature, and aging. The Arbiter PUF was one of the first proposed silicon-based PUFs and is shown in Fig. 1 . The challenge determines the signal path through a chain of multiplexors, and the response is set to logic 1 (0) when the signal through the upper path is faster (slower) than through the lower path. As the challenge determines the actual paths that the signals take, the response directly depends on the challenge and a large CRP-space is possible. The simplicity of the Arbiter PUF is one of its main weaknesses, and it is considered as one of the weakest PUFs under modelbuilding attacks as shown in Section II-E and can easily be predicted [6] .
To counter the predictability of the simple Arbiter PUF, the XOR Arbiter PUF was presented by Suh and Devadas [7] . It increases the internal complexity by combining the response of multiple Arbiter PUFs in an XOR operation. Despite its simplicity, this approach notably increases the difficulty of model-building attacks. However, two key factors limit the scalability of this approach: first, a k-XOR Arbiter PUF uses k different PUFs, and hence requires a linearly increasing number of PUFs. Second, the error rate of a simple Arbiter PUF increases to K-XOR = 1 − (1 − ) k . Therefore, the error rate scales linearly for small K. In a 28 nm field-programmable gate array (FPGA) implementation, an error rate of up to 0.317 was demonstrated for a 4-XOR Arbiter PUF, drastically limiting its applicability [8] .
A high error rate decreases the trusted party's ability to differentiate a true PUF from a counterfeit because the authentication protocol has to allow a threshold so that the probability of false rejection of an authentic response is low. Previous research has shown that k-XOR Arbiter PUFs are effective against model-building attacks when k ≥ 6 [6] , [9] . However, this number of Arbiter PUFs degrades the error rate and therefore, the effective defense against model building remains an unsolved problem.
D. Machine-Learning Techniques
1) Artificial Neural Networks: Artificial neural networks (ANNs) were initially designed after biological neural networks and are employed for tasks such as natural language processing and computer vision [10] . Each artificial neuron has inputs with corresponding weights and produces an output by applying a nonlinear activation function to the sum of weighted inputs. The activation function affects the number of neurons that are needed for complex computations and the computational cost of simulating a neural network. Typically, a sigmoidal function is used as it can be normalized to produce stable outputs and is easily derivable which is useful for updating the input weights [10] . Supervised learning is the process of training the network with known training labels.
A feed-forward network of neurons consists of an input layer, a problem-specific number of hidden layers, and an output layer without cycles. The number of layers in the neural network specifies the depth. The number of neurons in the input layer and output layer are constrained by the problem, in the case of PUFs to the challenge and response lengths, respectively. The number of hidden layers and the number of neurons in each hidden layer are derived heuristically. Increasing the number of neurons in the hidden layer allows modeling of higher complexity patterns, but can lead to overfitting and increases the computation time.
Backpropagation with gradient descent is a common learning algorithm for ANNs. For each weight w i,j , the corresponding impact on the error function E is derived from the chain rule, where w i,j is the weight between neuron i and neuron j. With this derivative and a problem-dependent learning factor , the weight is updated from iteration t to t + 1 to minimize the error function w i,j (t
The downside of backpropagation learning is that the weight update is dependent on the gradient, which has a small magnitude due to requirements on the activation function. Therefore, backpropagation can converge slowly. In resilient backpropagation (RPROP) [11] training, the change in weights does not directly depend on the gradient. Instead, the gradient only determines the direction of the weight update, and an individual update value i,j determines the magnitude of the weight update. This allows RPROP to converge much faster than backpropagation. In relevance to the evaluation in Section VII, an epoch is a single pass through the entire training set including early evaluation with a verification set. Therefore, a limitation to epochs is a more sensible termination criterion than pure runtime for the context of learning under an ANN.
In this paper, a feed-forward ANN is trained with a hyperbolic tangent sigmoid activation function. This function achieves the desired stabilizing behavior of the sigmoid function but is one of the most common activation functions because it ranges from [−1, 1] and therefore allows negative valued outputs.
2) Pattern Complexity and Model-Building Resistivity: The complexity of the pattern to be learned mandates the difficulty that a machine-learning algorithm faces in creating a model for it. A class of sets C is said to shatter a set A when the power set P(A) = {U ∩ A|U ∈ C}, meaning that each subset of A can be expressed as an intersection of A and a subset of C [12] . The Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension is a measure for the capacity of a classification algorithm: it is the cardinality of the largest subset that the algorithm can shatter. Therefore, the VC dimension provides insight on the complexity that the learning algorithm can represent. It also follows that a pattern that requires a learning algorithm with high VC dimension has a high pattern complexity.
For ANNs with sigmoidal activation function and fixed depth, the VC dimension is contained between the lower bound (ωlog(ω)) and upper bound O(ω 4 ), where ω is the number of programmable parameters [12] . For a neural network with a single hidden network, the number of programmable parameters is the sum of input neurons and hidden neurons. It follows that a neural network with more hidden neurons can characterize patterns that are more complex. Furthermore, when a pattern requires a larger amount of hidden neurons to be learned, it follows that this pattern has higher internal complexity. This is an important consideration for the experimental characterization of model-building resistivity in Section VII.
E. Security Threats
1) Model-Based Token Impersonation: Highly successful modeling attacks on Arbiter PUFs, ring-oscillator PUFs, feedforward Arbiter PUFs, simple PUFs, and XOR-Arbiter PUFs were demonstrated by Rührmair et al. [9] on synthetic PUFs. These attacks were based on logistic regression using RPROP gradient descent and evolutionary strategies. More recently, the authors expanded their results to include FPGA and application-specified integrated circuit (ASIC) implementations and showed results resembling those of their synthetic implementation [6] . In relevance to this contribution is that they broke a 128-bit and 64-bit Arbiter PUF in mere seconds, which leads to the assumption that this is indeed one of the weakest PUFs with regard to modeling attacks.
2) Side-Channel Information Extraction: It is in the nature of reasonably complex physical devices to leak information on the operation that is being performed, which is indirectly observable as a side-channel leakage through measurements of power, temperature, and other parameters. Side-channel attacks passively exploit this to extrapolate confidential information. This is true even for cryptographic modules such as the advanced encryption standard (AES), which is approved by the U.S. National Security Agency for top-secret documents. Researchers have demonstrated that a side-channel unaware implementation of 128-bit AES can be attacked to reveal the entire secret key with only 8000 measurements [13] . One technique against side-channel leakage is power randomization to reduce cross-correlation between power trace and performed operation [14] . Another approach is reducing leaked information by normalizing the consumed power in logic gates and interconnects [13] . Additionally, obfuscation is a technique to increase the difficulty of understanding and reverse-engineering hardware [14] , [15] , which limits the applicability of side-channel attacks as design and internals are hidden.
3) Physical Access and Tampering: Physical security is one of the root causes for the invention of the PUF. Conventionally, confidential information such as a secret key for encryption/decryption is stored in on-chip nonvolatile memory (NVM), as this information has to be preserved even when the device is powered down. However, this form of storage is vulnerable, as well-equipped adversaries can de-package the chip and physically access and read the contents of the NVM [16] , [17] . Moreover, adversaries can physically tamper circuitry with focused ion beams to modify or disable components [18] . Utilizing conventional hardware security in the form of tamper detection, metal meshes, and similar techniques are expensive in power and area and therefore are not applicable for lightweight devices [19] . Furthermore, semiinvasive attacks such as optical fault induction [20] allow adversaries to change individual bits in microcontroller memory by illumination. Therefore, the volatility that PUF provides is one of its strongest characteristics: when physically tampered with, the behavior changes and thus, the internal secret is destroyed. In Section V, we further discuss that PUF by itself is not a safeguard against invasive attacks for the entire device.
F. PUF Architectures and Protocols 1) Reliance on Strong PUFs:
The promise of a strong PUF is to provide a large challenge response space that is infeasible to model with state-of-the-art machine-learning techniques. A number of PUF-based protocols expose both the challenge and response and hence rely on this intrinsic modeling resistivity. However, no PUF design for a strong PUF achieves scalability and resistivity against model-building attacks without sacrificing reliability. This remains the most common issue among all protocols studied by Delvaux et al. [19] . For these reasons, an architecture that enables any PUF design to become a true strong PUF has significant merit and benefits a wide range of existing protocols. In Section III, we propose PolyPUF that achieves these goals.
2) Reverse Fuzzy Extractor: As previously described, most PUF-based authentication scenarios rely on a strong PUF that can resist model-building attacks yet achieves high reliability. The reverse fuzzy extractor (RFE) [21] attempts to avoid this requirement by hiding the actual PUF response: during authentication, the verifier issues a challenge c with random nonce x nonce , which is an arbitrary random bit-string for onetime usage. The PUF device then generates the actual response r puf , which contains perturbations due to environment variations, and the corresponding helper data d h . To hide the actual response r puf , the PUF device then releases a hash h PUF that contains the response. Using helper data d h and the true response r, the verifier can construct r which should match r puf if the PUF is authentic. The trusted party can then indirectly compare r and r puf by evaluating hash (r ) = h PUF .
Releasing helper data always leads to a loss of entropy [19] , [22] , and despite the measures taken the RFE, Delvaux et al. [19] demonstrated that an adversary can selectively issue challenges to solve a system of linear equations that characterizes the helper data leakage.
Furthermore, we emphasize that the entropy loss due to helper data leakage requires a significantly larger PUF challenge and response lengths. This in turn requires a larger challenge expander and a larger hash function [23] .
3) Slender PUF Protocol: The slender PUF protocol attempts to invalidate machine-learning-based attacks by exposing only a random substring of the response. The challenge to the PUF is determined by combining cryptographic nonces from the prover and verifier through a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). These nonces are generated from true random number generators (TRNGs). This challenge is available to both the prover and verifier, and cannot be fully controlled by one party. While it was the first protocol to efficiently introduce noise into the PUF response, it is limited by the requirement that it can only be applied on a true strong PUF that meets the avalanche criterion. Such a strong PUF can be approached with a k-XOR Arbiter PUF, however, this leads to a significant increase in the error rate. Rostami et al. [24] demonstrated that the substring has to consist of 1250 bits to achieve an acceptable false rejection rate of 1% with a 4-XOR Arbiter PUF. Additionally, the usage of a random nonce on the prover side probabilistically enables an adversary to select the nonce such that the resulting challenge has a small Hamming distance to a known challenge.
4) Noise Bifurcation PUF Architecture: Yu et al. [8] described a noise bifurcation PUF (NBPUF) architecture for PUFs that increases the noise for an adversary, reducing their ability to perform machine-learning attacks, without increasing the noise observed by the trusted party. In their architecture, out of every d bits in the response, d−1 bits are randomly discarded. Therefore, this architecture requires that the response be preexpanded by a factor of d. In authentication, only those bits are considered that have deterministic behavior, meaning that all d bits have the same value. Due to these discarded bits during authentication, the response has to be preexpanded by a factor of d · 2 d−1 and therefore increases exponentially. The evaluation is performed on synthetic PUFs and demonstrates that machine-learning does not converge with a dataset of 1 million CRPs when this architecture is applied to a 5-XOR and 6-XOR Arbiter PUF.
III. POLYPUF ARCHITECTURE The PolyPUF challenge-response behavior can take many different shapes, and randomly changes between them. As the shape changes randomly, an adversary cannot learn it using model-building attacks. However, a trusted party can use secret knowledge to verify the authenticity of responses despite the random behavioral changes. The ultimate goal of PolyPUF is to decouple the observed response r from the issued challenge c so that model building becomes impossible, while maintaining reliable challenge-response behavior. For this purpose, the challenge-response mapping is truly random for each individual output bit, and therefore goes beyond the complexity achieved in the NBPUF. Therefore, PolyPUF enables true strong PUFs that can withstand model-building attacks. The architecture is shown in Fig. 2 and is described in detail in the following sections.
A. Random Number Generation
Many PUF architectures and protocols rely on TRNGs as a core component, but do not provide sufficient measures to safeguard them against physical attacks [19] , [25] . Defending such components for large random numbers is difficult and expensive, as the complexity of defense measures to achieve physical security increases with the component's footprint.
The PolyPUF architecture overcomes these concerns by utilizing a very small TRNG that can be derived directly from the internal PUF and hence introduces minimal resource overhead and security concerns. During enrollment of the PUF, the trusted party programs a randomization challenge c x into the PUF, which was observed to have low reliability. One can derive the random bit-vector x by XOR-reducing the PUF response r = PUF(c x ) such that
This approach is physically secure, as the TRNG cannot be modified without changing the actual behavior of the internal PUF, which would render it useless. Furthermore, the XOR gates required for the TRNG can be embedded into most existing PUF designs.
The theoretical basis for this approach of generating small random numbers lies in the entropy maximizing nature of the XOR operation used in (2) . The bit-vector can be approximated as a series of independent random bits r(i) with a bias, such that E[r(i)] = μ. This is a conservative approach for entropy estimation, as the entropy of the XOR of two random variables is at least the entropy of the individual random variables. Under these considerations, the bias of each bit of the random seed vector is
If the randomization challenge c x is improperly selected to have an error rate of only 10%, which is worse than an average challenge in the Arbiter PUF [24] , the response bias would be β = 1 − = 0.9. Even in this situation, a 64-bit response can generate a 3-bit random seed vector with an expected value of E[x i ] = 0.505 according to (3) , is very close to the ideal 0.5. As discussed, it is critical that the random seed is short, and the expected value increases to E[x i ] = 0.66 for a random 12-bit seed.
When higher randomness is desired, e.g., because of small |r| or large |x|, this process can be repeated and the random numbers of each iteration can be XOR-combined.
B. Challenge Self-Divergence
Challenge self-divergence (CSD) achieves challengeresponse diffusion by diverging the challenge, which is issued to the device from the true challenge, which is processed through the internal PUF. Therefore, the true challenge is concealed from any outside party and is only observed and known within the security device itself.
First, the challenge divergence seed x c is generated as a short true random number by the PUF and its components as described in Section III-A. The apparent reasons for a short x c lie in reduced cost and facilitated PUF-based implementation, but it also has a profound effect on the verifiability and physical security of the PUF. We will show below that |x c | can be a very small value.
Second, x c is maximally expanded into divergence vector x c,v by repetition to match the challenge length of the PUF, such that |x c,v | = |c|. Finally, the true challenge is derived as c T = c ⊕ x c,v . This implies that each issued challenge is transformed into one of 2 |x c | possible true challenges.
The XOR operation is critical, as it combines the original challenge divergence seed and the original challenge with maximum entropy, as every output bit depends on both input bits. Moreover, this form of self-divergence performs a uniform action across all original challenge bits and is based on uniform XOR operations for random number generation. Therefore, it provides a strong foundation for resistivity against side-channel attacks and can be optimized for side-channel leakage minimization at the layout level.
For PolyPUF |x c | = 2 is a viable selection to achieve the desired polymorphic behavior, because it sufficiently diverges the challenge. Further increase of this would allow more possible challenges, but also requires a larger random seed and more computation on the server side, which are not desirable.
C. Response Self-Divergence
CSD only hides the challenge and therefore does not provide true polymorphic behavior-knowing the true response of the PUF can be a starting point for an advanced machine-learning exploit. Two problems remain as follows.
1) Additional decoupling is needed to achieve sufficient challenge-response diffusion without further increase of |x c |, which would have the aforementioned detrimental effects. 2) It does not provide any improvement to the bias that is typically observed in PUF behavior. To overcome both problems, we present a response self-divergence (RSD) scheme that complements CSD for truly polymorphic behavior. For this purpose, we have investigated RSD through a shuffling approach as well as an XOR approach similar to the one described in Section III-B. In both cases, the true response r T is divided into groups g i . Based on the same mechanism employed in Section III-A, a small response divergence seed vector x r is generated. For the XOR approach, each group g i is XORed with a response divergence seed x r . In the shuffling approach, the bits in the divergence seed determine whether consecutive groups are exchanged. The investigation showed that XOR performed much better, and the evaluation can be simplified to the following example: consider a case where shuffling is used with |x r | = 1, |r t | = 2, and |g i | = 1. The bias of the response in this example is
. Therefore, bias is very possible and not drastically reduced. For the case of XOR, as we outlined in Section III-A, the entropy of the response is as good as the entropy of the divergence seed.
Due to RSD and as a side-effect of polymorphism, PolyPUF achieves the strict avalanche criterion, as an individual challenge bit-flip leads to a bit-flip in the output with an average probability that can arbitrarily approach 0.5 based on design requirements and length of the RSD seed.
D. Polymorphism
Together, the challenge and response divergence grant polymorphic behavior, as the challenge-response behavior changes randomly. This behavior is illustrated in Fig. 3 for a very small PolyPUF with |x c | = 2 and |x r | = 1. In this example, a single challenge has eight possible responses, and PolyPUF will unpredictably issue one of these. Given a response to challenge c, it is practically impossible to infer which true challenge c T was actually evaluated by the internal PUF, because a large number of equally probable combinations of true challenge and true response exist. Even when a large CRP set is gathered, the true challenges and responses cannot be derived. In fact, this polymorphism is not restricted to adversaries, and the trusted party faces the same nondeterminism in PUF behavior. However, with the model of the internal PUF, the trusted party can explore the range of possible responses and thereby decide on the authenticity of the received response, as will be shown in Section IV.
We further explore the advantages of PolyPUF by discussing an alternative implementation where multiple actual PUFs are interchangeably used. The cost of implementing multiple PUFs is not negligible, but may be bearable in all but ultralightweight applications. However, this alternative approach also has the following downsides: if multiple internal PUFs were used, either: 1) all of them would compute the response and only one PUF would actually issue the response to the requestor, or 2) only one PUF is selected to compute and issue the response while the others remain inactive. Approach 1) has a considerable power overhead, and potentially reduces reliability due to cross talk between PUF instances, which requires careful design work. Approach 2) leaks significant side-channel information, as each PUF is unique and therefore exhibits a different power profile. Moreover, actually implementing multiple PUFs, independent of approaches 1) and 2), introduces the problem that advanced machine-learning techniques such as ANN discussed in Section II-A could perform space separation and hence cluster the PUFs and identify their individual challenge-response behaviors. PolyPUF does not suffer from any of these weaknesses, as all responses are issued by the identical internal PUF. Hence, the polymorphism originates in nondeterministic selfdivergence instead of space expansion and provides stronger security.
IV. POLYPUF APPLICATION Conceptually, PolyPUF was designed to provide a strong foundation against all threat vectors identified in Section I. The resistivity against modeling attacks arises from the polymorphic behavior described in Section III-D. The minimization of side-channel information leakage originates in the design optimizations to achieve said polymorphism. In the CSD, the initially generated random number is small to have a small range of possible challenges that the trusted party has to explore during authentication. Additionally, the proposed algorithm for performing CSD takes information leakage into account. For instance, consider a scheme to derive the true challenge by a summation of the original challenge with a random bit-vector x, which provides a range of [c, c + |x|] consecutive challenges. However, this approach: 1) leaks more side-channel information as summation leaks far more side-channel information than a simple XOR operation and 2) as the possible challenges lie close to another, knowledge of one CRP allows inference of other similar challenges due to the weak diffusion of the internal PUF, as reflected in (1).
A. Wide Applicability
As an architecture, PolyPUF has the unique advantage that it can be applied to almost every PUF design that allows a large challenge-response space and can turn it into a true strong PUF with model-building resistivity. Due to CSD and RSD, PolyPUF does not pose limiting requirements on bias, complexity, or reliability of the internal PUF. Even when the internal PUF exhibits biased behavior and does not achieve diffusion or meet the avalanche criterion, PolyPUF will exhibit high diffusion and meet the avalanche criterion.
The source of this lies in the polymorphic behavior specified in Section III-D, the model-building resistivity is grounded in this polymorphic behavior instead of characteristics of the internal PUF. We furthermore argue that PolyPUF is even applicable to the weakest known PUF designs where existing architectures such as the NBPUF do not provide sufficient improvement. We experimentally show that PolyPUF is indeed capable of this by evaluating it with a variety of Arbiter PUFs in Section VII.
B. Reliability
Two of the major benefits of PolyPUF are the reliability and scalability that this architecture achieves. Existing approaches to achieve a strong PUF rely on combination of the responses of multiple PUFs to increase the challengeresponse complexity. This, however, decreases the reliability of the resulting PUF, as an error in any of the individual PUFs leads to an error in the resulting PUF. For instance, the XOR-Arbiter PUF has an error rate that increases almost linearly with the number of contributing PUFs. A 4-XOR Arbiter PUF, which is not sufficient to achieve model-building resistivity, was shown to have an error rate of more than 30% [8] . In contrast to this, PolyPUF does not negatively affect reliability at all, as no error-magnifying combination of multiple PUFs is implemented. This means that PolyPUF can achieve the reliability of any single PUF instance that it is applied on.
C. Authentication Protocol
We consider parametric authentication, the most common scenario for PUF [7] , [8] , [25] . Here, the trusted party generates a true model for the internal PUF in an enrollment phase with access to the internal PUF. Afterward, any outside access to the internal PUF is physically deleted, e.g., through fuses.
Accurate authentication is possible despite the CSD and RSD due to several considerations in the PolyPUF specification. The CSD and RSD seeds x c and x r were specified as a small bit-vectors, which allows the trusted party to computationally explore all options. By exploring the previously described operations and querying the secret model, the trusted party can find all |S CRP | = 2 |x c |+ x r possible responses. Although this equation is exponential, we emphasize that: 1) the experimental evaluation shows that |x c | = 2 is sufficient to thwart the strongest known machine-learning techniques; 2) |x r | can be specified by the trusted party to balance computational cost on the server side with machinelearning resistivity in the PUF; 3) evaluating a known and established PUF model typically consumes a minimal amount of time; and 4) whereas size and energy cost of the PUF is critical, the computational requirements to the server are much more bearable.
Finally, the response of the PUF is authenticated if it is part of the set of possible responses. When bit-errors are considered, a trusted party can iteratively compute the candidate response r c = argmin r i S CRP |r i − r|. In the simplest form, r can be accepted if |r c − r| < t , where t is a scenariospecific authentication threshold. We emphasize that a small threshold should be sufficient, as PolyPUF is the only known architecture to increase modeling resistance without negatively affecting reliability.
V. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS A. Pitfalls of Challenge Expansion
Challenge expansion is a technique typically employed for lightweight PUFs. Challenge expansion implies that the application or protocol requires |r| > 1 output bits from the PUF. For example, in an encryption scenario, a secret key of more than 128 bits is desired to increase the time consumption of brute-force attacks. Similarly, in authentication where the PUF response is used for authentication, a large output length is desirable to minimize the probability of a random guess achieving false acceptance.
However, implementing a large number of PUFs can be expensive in the power and circuit area. Therefore, a small number of actual PUFs with |r puf | < |r| output bits is expanded to a length of |r| by challenge expansion. In a typical implementation, only a single PUF with |r puf | = 1 is implemented. The desired number of output bits |r| is sequentially generated through |r| challenges that are produced by a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). As the original challenge can be used as a seed, the responses remain consistent across multiple queries. Whereas this is highly cost efficient and maximally reuses each PUF instance, several security, and practicality concerns exist.
First, challenge expansion itself is not physically secure. One of the main advantages of PUF is its volatility that limits the success of invasive physical attacks. However, the challenge expansion circuitry remains physically attackable and thus requires extensive conventional defenses. This diminishes some of the cost savings introduced by PUF and reduces the range of viable applications. Second, implementing a large PRNG or cryptographically secure hash function to perform challenge expansion is expensive in itself [23] . As some PUFs are very lightweight, the difference between a challengeexpanded PUF and a PUF that actually consists of multiple parallel elements may be insignificant compared to the security advantages. Additionally, challenge expansion decreases the diffusion described in Section II, as all response bits originate in the identical PUF. Furthermore, it is common that a single PUF exhibits only weak diffusion and strong bias, as the nano-scale intrinsic variations cannot be controlled. Therefore, relying on a single PUF increases the likelihood of a device that is unusable from a security perspective. Besides, designs that employ a single PUF with a challenge expander expose n out responses of the PUF in a single CRP, hence allowing any adversary to gather large per-PUF CRP sets.
For these reasons, the internal PUF is proposed to be implemented with multiple individual PUF elements. In the experimental evaluation, the internal PUF is comprised of individual PUF elements for each configuration without any challenge expansion.
B. Reliance on True Random Numbers
Multiple PUF designs and architectures involve the utilization of TRNGs without providing guidelines for a secure design for this element. Particularly in this scenario involving PUFs, all relevant components have to achieve a certain degree of resistivity against invasive attacks described in Section II-E. Without this consideration, an adversary may tamper, disable, or guide the generation of random numbers and hence compromise security.
To illustrate this shortcoming, the adversary could modify the nonce generator in the NBPUF architecture to a fixed bitvector if insufficient countermeasures are implemented. Then, the adversary has full control of the challenge generation and can exploit this by repeatedly issuing the same challenges.
To utilize true random numbers without exposing a vulnerability or requiring extensive conventional security measures, PolyPUF requires a very small TRNG. Furthermore, an implementation that reuses the internal PUF for inherent security against invasive attacks was outlined in Section III-A.
C. Entropy Oblivious Design
We challenge the reliance on error-correction or highacceptance thresholds for PUF-based authentication. Koeberl et al. [22] have recently performed an extensive entropy and error-correction analysis and shown that min-entropy is often over-estimated. Additionally, they demonstrated that correcting an error of 15% and PUF min-entropy of 15% requires a PUF response length that is more than 15 times the size of the desired entropy. This enormously increases the cost of PUF and diminishes the lightweight characteristic that is one of PUFs strongest features.
Similarly, relying on a higher authentication threshold instead of error correction also introduces new problems.
For one, the length of the PUF has to be increased so that the probability of random guessing remains small. Furthermore, due to noise in the PUF response, it is very difficult to discern the noisy PUF from an emulated PUF that takes advantage of PUF bias. Delvaux et al. [19] have made similar conclusions and have shown that existing PUF authentication protocols have insufficient security and practicality. These results imply that employing XOR, feedback, and feed-forward-based architectures to increase modeling resistivity provides insufficient improvements and introduces other difficulties.
VI. ATTACK ANALYSIS A. Random Guessing
The simplest and least effective approach to impersonate a PUF is to respond to a challenge with a random response. In the following, the threshold t refers to the maximum Hamming distance to the correct response for which the received response can be accepted as authentic.
For PolyPUF, the probability of a random guessing attack is slightly increased, as multiple responses are possible for any given challenge. In the following, we consider the 64 × 64 PolyPUF with |x c | = 2 and |x r | = 3. Therefore, the probability of a false acceptance in this ideal scenario without consideration of bit-errors due to environment variations equals
Under consideration of bit-errors that are typical due to PUF volatility, the probability for false acceptance increases. The trusted party can compute all possible responses, identify the most likely correct response r ideal , and accept the provided response if r ideal ,r ≤ t . Recall that PolyPUF can be assumed to be unbiased due to the RSD, therefore the bias is β = 0.5. The false acceptance probability under consideration of biterrors equals
Assuming a 10% bit error rate in the internal Arbiter PUF, one may set the threshold to t = 12 and achieve a false acceptance probability of P FA,real = 7.3 · 10 −6 .
Note that this is only a factor of 32 larger than the false acceptance probability when a simple Arbiter PUF is used, without PolyPUF. Especially larger PUF sizes as used in practice, e.g., |x r | = 256, this increase in false acceptance probability is diminishing.
The probability of false rejection for the proposed protocol is almost negligibly larger than the probability for the case that a simple Arbiter PUF is authenticated. The bit-error rate is denoted by and is not increased by PolyPUF. The probability for correct acceptance of the Arbiter PUF is
Similarly, the probability of correct acceptance for PolyPUF can be derived by considering that a larger number of responses are acceptable
Finally, the probability of false rejection is P FR = 1 − P CA and can be quantified as P FR = 0.01 for this example implementation.
B. Direct Machine Learning
The direct approach of machine-learning on a large CRP set is bound to fail against PolyPUF, as these CRPs are virtually guaranteed to be derived from multiple different PolyPUF instantiations. As the exact nature of the instantiation is unknown, it is impossible to derive the relation between responses of different challenges across different instantiations. The experimental results for this are shown in Section VII-B.
C. Brute-force Machine Learning
In this section, we discuss the cost of performing a bruteforce attack on PolyPUF by gathering all possible responses for a given number of challenges, and then training a model for each possible combination of responses.
Let us assume that the internal PUF is considered to be accurately learned if the number of known CRP pairs reaches k CRP . Thus, the attacker aims to gather k CRP challenge response pairs of a single instantiation of PolyPUF.
Given challenge seed vector length |x c | and response seed vector length |x R |, the number of PolyPUF instantiations is r limit = 2 |x c |+|x r | .
For a given challenge c i , the probability that the attacker has observed all r limit instantiations after issuing this challenge n trial times is
For the example implementation with |x c | = 2 and |x r | = 3 it follows that r limit = 32. To achieve a probability P i = 99% of having observed all possible instantiations, the adversary has to issue the same challenge N C = 260 times. Thus, the adversary is required to perform 260 · K CRP authentications with the PUF device to gather a sufficiently large dataset.
Once this dataset is established, the adversary has to train one model for each permutation of CRPs in the dataset. Thus, the number of models to be trained is n models = r k crp limit . This brute-force approach guarantees that one of the models was trained on a pure CRP set that corresponds to a single instantiation. However, the number of models that need to be learned increases exponentially and therefore, this is not a feasible attack. Even when a simple Arbiter PUF is used, K CRP = 5000 and N CR = 32 requires training of approximately 5.6 · 10 7525 models.
D. Cross Inference Attack
There are two possible attack vectors for the adversary: attempt to learn the internal PUF by gathering true challenge and true response pairs, or attacking one shape of PolyPUF by gathering a CRP set that corresponds to a single shape.
The adversary cannot identify the actual values for the divergence seeds, but he or she can characterize several of them relative to an assumed initial value of x c0 and x r0 from the initial CRP, which we denote by CRP 0 = {c 0 , x c0 , x r0 }. The adversary can enumerate all S c = 2 |x c | possible true challenges and trivially characterize one response with regard to the initial seeds:
This can then be expanded so that all possible responses for these challenges are well characterized with regard to x c0 and x r0 by enumerating the possible RSD operations: CRP ij = {c 0 ⊕k c,i , x c0 ⊕k c,i , x r0 ⊕k r,j }. Then, the set of understood CRPs is S CRP = 2 |x c |+|x r | . However, it is impossible to learn and explicitly characterize a CRP that corresponds to a challenge not found in S c . Therefore, the number of CRPs that can deterministically be clustered is limited to |S CRP |. While infinitely many of these clusters can be created, they are all characterized with regard to a cluster-specific assumed x c0 and x r0 as reference point and can therefore not contribute to a coherent model. This can be proven by considering the set of possible CSD seeds S x,c . It is notable that every possible bit-vector with length |x c | is contained in this set, thus |S x,c | = 2 |x c | . If challenge c i was derived through seed x c i = x c0 XOR k i , then any seed of derivable challenge c i+1 can be reduced to
As all possible divergence seeds with length |x c | were explored, it must be that (k i ⊕ k i+1 ) ∈ S x,c .
E. Targeted Model-Building
Considering that the intended application of PolyPUF is to strengthen an internal PUF with weak machine-learning resistance, an attack may exploit the weak statistical properties of this internal PUF. These weak statistical properties imply that the avalanche criterion is not met, and that one CRP reveals information on arithmetically close other challenges as shown in (1) . An adversary may attempt to exploit this behavior to identify those CRPs that are of the same PolyPUF instantiation. If the adversary can gather a large set of CRPs that correspond to the same PolyPUF instantiation, then he or she can perform simple machine-learning on it and should achieve results similar to those of directly attacking the internal PUF.
In Algorithm 1, we outline an approach to gather a set S CRP of challenge-response pairs that have a better than average probability of belonging to the same PolyPUF instantiation. The attacker first issues a random challenge and remembers the response it receives. It then repeatedly selects new challenges that have a Hamming distance of one to the previous challenge. For this purpose, the function randomize performs a random bit-flip and ensures that the resulting challenge has not been processed yet. For each of these challenges, the algorithms attempt to perform a full response-space exploration by reissuing the same challenge until either: 1) the maximum amount of distinct responses r limit = 2 |x c |+|x r | have been observed, or 2) a desired limit of PUF transaction c limit has been reached. At that point, it chooses the most probably response.
The algorithm repeatedly selects new challenges with Hamming distance of one to each other, so that a larger section of the challenge space can get explored while maintaining a short distance between consecutive challenges, so that the statistical weakness of the internal PUF is maximally exploited.
Although this approach appears to be a promising attack as it exploits the weak statistical nature of the internal PUF, two disadvantages have to be specified.
1) It has to be emphasized that (1) only applies to the average of a large set of CRPs, and certainly does not Algorithm 1 Targeted Machine-Learning Attack Input: c limit -limit for number of total challenges to issue t limit -limit for repetitions of a single challenge r limit -number of possible PolyPUF instantiations Output: S CRP -set of selected challenge-response pairs Current challenge c=GenerateRandomChallenge() Selected Challenge-Response Pairs S CRP = {} Number of issued challenges n c = 0 While(n c < c limit ) Previous challenge c prev = c RANDOMIZE(c) Observed Responses O r = {} Trial number n t = 0 While(n t < t limit And |O r | < r limit )
apply to every CRP. With this attack approach, there will be incorrect selections, which will lead to propagation errors. 2) Any PUF without error correction will experience a certain number of bit errors, which will also propagate through the response selection and lead to a larger count of incorrect selections. Even though it is not successful, it should be noted that this attack requires multiple orders of magnitude more challenge-response interactions with PolyPUF compared to a direct attack against the internal PUF. The experimental results of this attack are presented in Section VII-D.
VII. EVALUATION
We evaluated a synthetic implementation of PolyPUF under machine-learning attacks and compare results to our implementation of the NBPUF architecture, described in Section II-F. Both architectures are designed to increase the modeling resistivity, hence we evaluate with the weakest known internal PUF from Section II, the simple Arbiter PUF. For PolyPUF, |x c | = 2 and |x r | = 3. For the NBPUF, we select d = 2 as proposed by the Yu et al. We note that for the evaluation of it, we allow four times the number of output bits compared to PolyPUF, as the architecture requires omitting three-fourths of output bits. 
A. Machine-Learning Setup and Preparation
The ANN was trained with RPROP as specified in Section II-A, using MATLAB. The termination criteria were set to be 1000 epochs, a performance gradient of less than 10 −5 , or six iterations with decreasing validation performance.
We challenge the practice of performing machine-learning attacks on a single PUF output bit and emphasize that the following are based on training of all output bits. This has two reasons: first, PUF is based on intrinsic physical variations and when observing a single PUF output bit, the results can be skewed and may not be representative. Second, most machine-learning algorithms use a random initialization vector and therefore, a single response bit evaluation increases the evaluation dependence on this initialization.
The capability of ANNs can be controlled through the number of neurons in the hidden layer. Although there are heuristics, there is no analytical solution to derive the optimal size of the hidden layer for a practical problem such as building a PUF model. Therefore, we experimentally evaluated each of the internal PUFs with varying number of neurons in the hidden layer to find the least error rate configuration. These experiments simultaneously provided the baseline for following experiments, and also provided insight into the current weakness of PUF scalability. The results of this evaluation are shown in Table I . The optimal number of neurons was experimentally derived for each configuration and size of the Arbiter PUF, and is highlighted in bold font in the table.
As discussed in Section II-A, the number of neurons together with the error rate provides insight into the pattern complexity. These experiments emphasize a key problem with PUF: the CRP space is easily expanded, but the pattern complexity and resistivity against model-building attacks do not scale accordingly. Moving from a PUF size of 32 × 32 to 64 × 64 has almost negligible impact on the complexity of After deriving the optimal number of neurons for each internal PUF, we performed experiments on PolyPUF and NBPUF with this optimal ANN configuration.
B. Resistance Against Malicious Model-Building
A comparison of ANN-based model-building against various configurations of a basic PUF architecture, the NBPUF, and PolyPUF is shown in Table II . For each architecture, this table evaluates the model-building error against three internal PUFs: an Arbiter PUF which is expected to have the least model-building resistivity, a 2-XOR Arbiter PUF, and a 4-XOR Arbiter PUF with the highest model-building resistivity. To illustrate the increasing modeling accuracy with a larger training size, this table provides the error rates for training set sizes between 5k and 1M CRPs.
As the results are consistent and for brevity, we only discuss the results for 5k and 1M CRPs. For the same reasons, we only discuss the simple Arbiter and 4-XOR Arbiter PUFs.
The probabilities for successful guessing attacks for various PUF configurations are shown in the last column of Table II . As previously described, the polymorphic nature of PolyPUF leads to a small increase in the success probability of such an attack, but it remains clearly lower than that of the NBPUF.
Three clear patterns can be observed from this table: 1) the model-building error rate and hence resistance increases with a more complex internal PUF; 2) increasing the training set size reduces the prediction error rate; and 3) scaling the PUF by increasing the challenge-length from 32 bits to 64 bits has minimal impact. These results support the motivation that a new approach to model-building resistance is needed.
For a 32 × 32 Arbiter PUF as internal PUF, the basic architecture and NBPUF architecture are learned to error rates of only 0.66% and 2.44%, respectively, with only 5k CRPs in the training set. This implies that both of these architectures are considered to have been broken. As the training set size is increased, the error rate only decreases. In contrast, even with a significantly larger training set of 1M CRPs, the error rate against PolyPUF is 50% and therefore, the modelbuilding resistance of PolyPUF exceeds that of the reference architectures by multiple orders of magnitude.
For the very complex 4-XOR Arbiter PUF as internal PUF, the baseline architectures perform much better. For the case of 5k CRPs, the 32 × 32 basic architecture and NBPUF achieve an error rate of 38.81% and 40.78%. The modelbuilding attack against PolyPUF had an error rate of 50.1%, which is clearly higher, but all of these architectures are considered to have resisted this model-building attack. As the intensity of the attack is increased by increasing the training set size to 1M CRPs, PolyPUF shows its advantages. Whereas the basic architecture and the NBPUF have error rates of 8.84% and 4.57%, respectively, and thus were sufficiently modeled, PolyPUF has an error rate of 49.95% and thus remained resistant against this attack.
Another observation from Table II is the weakness of the NBPUF compared to the basic architecture. Although the error rate is larger for the NBPUF for smaller training sets, it is half of the error rate of the basic architecture under a training set of one million CRPs. This suggests that a large training set allows an ANN to train the NBPUF very efficiently. We propose that such a large training set is sufficient to identify the patterns in the PUF challenge-response behavior to identify those bits that randomly flip, and those that are consistent. Whereas random bits are impossible to learn, the consistent bits are learned with a much higher accuracy, as they remain consistent across multiple challenges. As the NBPUF only utilizes the consistent bits and discards the random bits in the evaluation, a welltrained ANN can model it to high accuracy.
Overall, the results in this table support our claim that PolyPUF is able to drastically increase the model-building resistivity of PUFs and that the polymorphic behavior is able to confuse machine-learning algorithms even when very large training data is employed. Fig. 4 illustrates the per-bit error rate of the learned models for the basic architecture, NBPUF, and PolyPUF. For each of these architectures, the model for the 64 × 64 PUF which was trained with 1M CRPs from Table II was evaluated for 5k malicious authentication attempts. For authentication, the Hamming distance between malicious authentication attempts and noisy responses of a true PUF is significant to determine a viable acceptance threshold. These figures emphasize that Fig. 4 . Comparison of five thousand malicious ANN authentication attempts. Depicted is the error rate of malicious authentication attempts, higher is better. From left to right, the internal PUF is a simple Arbiter PUF, 2-XOR Arbiter PUF, and 4-XOR Arbiter PUF. Only PolyPUF has a consistent threshold to the illustrated typical PUF error rate. PolyPUF is the only architecture that maintains a consistent distance to a typical PUF bit-error rate, which is approximated to 10%.
C. Model-Building Authentication Attack
D. Targeted Model-Building Experiment
The outcome of the targeted model-building attack is summarized in Table III . The result of the simplified method of targeted model-building is an error rate of 49.44% and 50.1% for 1M and 100M total issued challenges. These total challenges correspond to 10 289 and 1 029 167 gathered challenges, respectively. These results demonstrate that this targeted model-building attack does not increase the success probability of an adversary, as PolyPUF behavior remains a virtual blackbox. The underlying reason for this successful defense is shown in Fig. 5 . The Hamming distances between the seed value for the initially selected response and subsequently selected responses are shown. Clearly, the fundamental idea behind the attack holds, and multiple consecutive challenges that correspond to the same divergence seed values are found. However, these results also demonstrate that the overall Hamming distance behaves almost like white noise, and therefore the attacker is learning multiple different instances of PolyPUF and cannot infer a clear model. Since it is impossible for the adversary to consider only those responses that have same seed values, the attack is bound to fail. The visualization of the Hamming distances in the more expensive selection approach is very similar and thus omitted for brevity.
E. Implementation Cost
PolyPUF offers multiple hardware implementation cost improvements. First, PolyPUF solves the requirement of error correction or cryptographic hashing for authentication and thereby removes two heavyweight but common components in existing PUF protocols [19] , [23] . Second, due to the self-divergent approach, PolyPUF does not have a need for a dedicated random number generator and can instead take advantage of the internal PUF itself. This reduces the number of hardware units as well as requiring less usage of conventional security techniques to prevent invasive attacks.
With the drastically increased strength against machinelearning, the internal PUF does not need to be duplicated multiple times. In contrast, existing protocols such as the slender PUF protocol [24] , [25] and the NBPUF [8] require a strong PUF that meets the avalanche criterion. In the following evaluation, we approximate a strong PUF with a 4-XOR Arbiter PUF.
The following is a quantitative analysis of the implementation overhead of PolyPUF compared to other PUF architectures for a Xilinx Virtex XC5VJX58T, which was chosen for comparability with existing literature [25] .
To achieve comparability among multiple architectures, the implementations are driven by the requirements that: 1) the internal PUF generates longer responses through challenge expansion and that 2) a full response is generated as part of the PUF structure, rather than streaming individual bits of the PUF response. Each of these architectures is applied on a PUF with 64 input bits. As with the previous evaluation, we consider PolyPUF with 64 output bits and a simple Arbiter PUF as the internal PUF. As both the slender PUF and the NBPUF require a strong PUF, they are implemented with 4-XOR Arbiter PUFs, which have a higher error rate. The results of Rostami et al. [24] suggested an error rate of 13.2% for a simple Arbiter PUF and 43.2% for a 4-XOR Arbiter PUF.
The high error rate of the required internal PUF requires that the NBPUF transmits a very long response. According to the formulas provided by Yu et al. [8] , even selecting a response length of 400 bits and a threshold of 133 bits leads to a false rejection rate and false acceptance rate of 11.9% and 7.3%, respectively, both of which are far inferior to the statistical properties that PolyPUF achieves. For conservative comparison, we evaluate against this configuration, although it provides less security than PolyPUF. The false acceptance and false rejection rates for the slender PUF [25] can be reduced to the same equations as the NBPUF architecture for the case that L sub = L, which is beneficial for evaluation of these statistical properties.
Our implementations of slender PUF and NBPUF use the same approach for combining the prover and verifier nonce through an XOR operation. As a further energy optimization in the NBPUF, we assume that the PUF response is not generated for the bit that is discarded. Similarly, we assume that PUF responses that are skipped during substring selection in the slender PUF are not generated to save energy.
The energy cost comparison in Table IV shows the number of operations that each PUF architecture requires generating a full response. We do not further quantify the energy cost as it is highly dependent on implementation, platform (e.g., FPGA and ASIC), and means of data transmission. However, we would like to emphasize the clear trend that PolyPUF requires the least amount of energy for both generation and transmission of a response. A single PUF operation is significantly more expensive than an XOR operation, as the signal has to travel through 64 stages. Furthermore, we note that most protocols do not consider the cost of data transmission, although it may require most of the available energy budget. Particularly for wireless sensor networks and similar mobile applications, data transmission can be the primary source of energy consumption [4] . In contrast to PolyPUF, both reference architectures transmit longer responses and exchange nonces. PolyPUF requires 93.1% less transmission than NBPUF and 82.6% less than the slender PUF. As Wander et al. [4] found that transmission of a single bit is equivalent to roughly 2090 clock cycles of execution on the microcontroller under test, it is clear that the reduction in response length leads to significant energy savings.
The hardware implementation cost of PolyPUF in comparison to the reference architectures is shown in Table V . To achieve a conservative comparison, we evaluated only the security relevant components and disregarded control logic. Similar to PolyPUF, both reference architectures are highly efficient and do not require error-correction or cryptographic hash functions. Therefore, the primary cost reduction is achieved because these reference architectures require usage of a strong PUF, which is here implemented as a 4-XOR Arbiter PUF. This PUF is roughly four times as expensive as the simple Arbiter PUF that PolyPUF employs. Additionally, PolyPUF employs the internal PUF for random number generation and has a small overhead for generation of x c and x r in contrast to the TRNG that the reference architectures require. As they operate in sequence and can therefore reuse the same hardware, CSD, and RSD are lightweight as well.
Note that response generation in PolyPUF will be much faster, as this comparison assumed sequential generation of responsebits. To achieve a similar throughput to PolyPUF, the reference architectures would require more parallel PUF components.
VIII. CONCLUSION The primary challenges for PUF are their reliability under environment variations, and their resistivity against advanced machine-learning-based model-building attacks. Existing techniques to increase PUF model-building resistivity are not scalable due to their detrimental effect on PUF reliability.
We proposed PolyPUF, a widely applicable PUF architecture that employs CSD and RSD to provide polymorphous PUF behavior. This changes the challenge-response behavior to be nondeterministic and unpredictable, while still being verifiable in an authentication scenario. In an extensive evaluation, this polymorphic behavior was shown to provide strong resistivity against model-building attacks and was the only architecture to withstand an ANN model trained with one million CRPs by increasing the model-building resistance by more than an order of magnitude. Moreover, PolyPUF achieves model-building resistance without negatively affecting the reliability of the PUF device, which uniquely qualifies it for practical scenarios.
As part of our experimental evaluation, it was shown that neural networks with large training size overcome deterministic noise such as induced by the NBPUF architecture. Therefore, truly random behavior such as exhibited by PolyPUF is a necessity.
We have further demonstrated that PolyPUF introduces less hardware overhead than reference architectures, and reduces the energy cost for generating a PUF response. Additionally, PolyPUF requires transmission of much smaller responses, which can provide significant energy savings.
Although existing work has shown that synthetic PUFs behave very closely to silicon or FPGA implementations, the strength of PolyPUF should be evaluated in a silicon or FPGA implementation in future work. This will also enable exploration of side-channel leakage and optimized designs to counter this.
